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 A B S T R A C T  
This research aims to analyze and empirically prove the effects of firm size, 
profitability, and leverage on transfer pricing aggressiveness moderated by corporate 
governance. It used a sample consisting of 73 multinational firms listed in both 
www.idx.co.id and www.bursamalaysia.com from 2018 to 2019. The data were 
analyzed using multiple linier regression and moderated regression analysis (MRA) 
to analyze and empirically prove the effects of firm size, profitability, and leverage on 
transfer pricing aggressiveness moderated by corporate governance. The results 
showed that leverage positively affected transfer pricing aggressiveness, whereas firm 
size and profitability did not. Corporate governance evidently weakened the effect of 
leverage on transfer pricing aggressiveness. This research contributes to increasing 
the state revenue through the taxation sector by exposing the determinants of transfer 
pricing aggressiveness that harm the state, and to assist public policy makers, 
especially those who are in charge of the policies related to transactions with special 
relationship. 
 
 A B S T R A K  
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menguji dan membuktikan secara empiris pengaruh 
ukuran perusahaan, profitabilitas, dan leverage terhadap agresivitas harga transfer 
yang di moderasi oleh corporate governance. Data penelitian menggunakan perusahaan 
multinasional yang bersumber dari www.idx.co.id dan www.bursamalaysia.com dalam 
kurun waktu 2018-2019 dengan jumlah sampel 72 perusahaan. Analisis data penelitian 
ini menggunakan regresi linier berganda dengan moderated regression analysis (MRA) 
untuk menguji dan membuktikan secara empiris pengaruh ukuran perusahaan, 
profitabilitas, dan leverage terhadap agresivitas harga transfer yang di moderasi oleh 
corporate governance. Hasil penelitian menemukan bahwa leverage berpengaruh positif 
terhadap agresivitas harga transfer, sedangkan ukuran perusahaan dan profitabilitas 
tidak berpengaruh terhadap agresivitas harga transfer. Corporate governance terbukti 
memperlemah hubungan leverage terhadap agresivitas harga transfer. Penelitian ini 
memberikan implikasi membantu meningkatkan pendapatan negara melalui sector 
perpajakan dengan menunjukkan faktor-faktor yang mempengaruhi agresivitas harga 
transfer yang dapat merugikan negara, serta membantu para pembuat kebijakan public 





Transfer pricing has shifted its meaning and 
practice. Such a meaning shift is known as an abuse 
of transfer pricing. It refers to a transfer of a firm’s 
profits in high-tax countries to low-tax countries that 
lowers a firm’s overall tax burdens should be paid to 
the state (Aditya, 2015). The practice of transfer 
pricing was initially done to access and evaluate the 
performance of the firm’s divisions. However, as the 
economy develops, transfer pricing is used to 
maximize profits and tax management (Conover & 
Nichols, 2000). 
From the perspective of multinational firms, 
this practice is used to minimize the amount of taxes 
and customs paid to the state by shifting profits, 
assets, and risks to other low-tax countries (Löffler, 
2019). The main problem of this practice, in terms of 
taxation is on lowering or even negating the state’s 
tax (Huda, Nugraheni & Kamarudin, 2017). This 
practice often occurs between firms or divisions that 
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have special relationships (Richardson et al., 2013). 
The theory of agency proposed by Jensen & 
Meckling (1976) describes that there are always 
opportunistic phenomena in a firm, and humans as 
individuals tend to maximize their utility. One of the 
determinants affecting the practice of transfer 
pricing is the firm size (Waworuntu & Hadisaputra, 
2016; Anh, Hieu & Nga, 2018). Yet, large firms that 
conduct transfer pricing transactions generally pay 
lower taxes that are not in accordance with the tax 
obligations they should pay to the state (Oyelere & 
Emmanuel, 1998). In addition, firms with high 
profits tend to be involved in transactions or 
schemes designed to avoid tax burdens (Rego, 2005). 
More obviously, firms with a larger proportion of 
debts than equity tend to exploit tax loopholes 
aggressively (Richardson, Hanlon & Nethercott, 
1998).  
Transfer pricing practice often occurs in 
developing countries such as Indonesia and 
Malaysia, and certainly is detrimental to their state 
revenue. These two countries have the same 
problems related to transfer pricing practices. In this 
problem, the tax ratio of the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) of these two countries is quite similar. For 
example, in 2018, Indonesia’s tax ratio was 13.5% 
while Malaysia’s 15% (Makki, 2019). 
Transfer pricing becomes an interesting issue 
and gets the tax authorities’ more careful attention 
in various countries due to the profit shifting from 
the tax sector (Suandy, 2011). According to the 
Directorate General of Taxes, transfer pricing 
practices greatly affect the state tax revenue. 
Indonesia potentially loses Rp 100 trillion in tax 
revenue each year due to the practice of tax planning 
and transfer pricing (Sugianto, 2015). The example 
of this transfer pricing practice in Indonesia is the 
case of PT Adaro Indonesia’s coal selling price 
manipulation. The firm allegedly sold coals with a 
below-market price to its Singaporean affiliate, Coal 
trade Services International Pte, Ltd., in 2005 and 
2006 (Wareza, 2019). 
Global Financial Integrity (GFI) estimates there 
is around 80 percent of unrecorded financial flows 
(USD 227.1 billion) in Malaysia from 2001 to 2010 
due to mispricing in international trade (Kar & 
Freitas, 2012). Transfer pricing practices can be 
proven by the case of Pasaraya MM Sdn Bhd, in 
which the transfer pricing guidelines issued by the 
Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia (IRBM) do not 
have any legal impact on the case (Swire, 2013). 
These two cases show that the impact of transfer 
pricing practices carried out by multinational firms 
seriously detrimental to Indonesia and Malaysia. 
Based on these problems, this research attempts to 
determine which determinants affecting transfer 
pricing aggressiveness. 
This research is a development of researches 
conducted by Richardson et al. (2013), Waworuntu 
& Hadisaputra (2016), and Anh et al. (2018). 
Richardson et al. (2013) show that firm size, 
profitability, and leverage have a positive effect on 
transfer pricing aggressiveness. Waworuntu & 
Hadisaputra (2016) also found that firm size and 
leverage have a positive effect on transfer pricing 
aggressiveness, while profitability does not have an 
effect on transfer pricing aggressiveness.  Anh et al. 
(2018) prove that firm size and leverage have a 
positive effect on transfer pricing aggressiveness, 
while profitability does not have an effect on transfer 
pricing aggressiveness. However, Rusydi (2013) 
argues that firm size does not affect aggressive tax 
avoidance. Tiaras & Wijaya (2015) prove that 
leverage shows no significant effect on the level of 
corporate tax aggressiveness. It contributes to 
current researches in a way that it uses corporate 
governance as a moderating variable of firm size, 
profitability, and leverage on transfer pricing 
aggressiveness. The use of this moderating variable 
is grounded based on the statement of Baron & 
Kenny (1986) that a moderating variable is used 
when there is a low relationship or inconsistency 
between the independent and dependent variables. 
Hoetker & Mellewigt (2011) explain that governance 
structure helps to minimize the risk of opportunistic 
behaviors. Sari, Handajani & AM (2016) assert that it 
is of importance to pay attention to the crucial role 
of good governance as a control mechanism for 
managers’ opportunistic behaviors. 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND 
HYPOTHESES 
The theoretical basis this study used is agency 
theory and the literature review is based on tax 
avoidance, transfer pricing aggressiveness, firm 




Agency theory is a contract between principal and 
agent. A principal is a party delegating the authority 
to the agent as the party receiving the authority’s 
delegation (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This theory is 
rooted from the synergy of economic theory, 
decision theory, sociology, and organizational 
theory. It elaborates that the agency theory occurs 
when one or more individuals, referred to as a 
principal, hire an individual or another 
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organization, referred to as an agent, to perform a 
number of services and delegate the authority to 
make decisions (Brigham & Houston, 2010). 
Transfer pricing transactions can occur among firms 
or divisions with special relationships. Transactions 
involving special relationships among firms or 
divisions tend to potentially create a conflict of 
interest in the form of opportunistic transactions. 
 
Tax Avoidance 
Tax avoidance is a scheme to minimize tax burdens 
by exploiting loopholes in a state’s tax provisions. 
According to Dyreng et al. (2010), tax avoidance is 
an attempt to reduce or even negate tax burdens that 
should be paid without violating existing laws. It is 
an attempt to avoid taxes affecting tax liabilities by 
means of not violating tax provisions. It is 
commonly done by exploiting weaknesses in tax 
laws and regulations to minimize the amount of 
taxes payable.  
 
Transfer Pricing Aggressiveness 
Transfer pricing aggressiveness reflects a pricing in 
every good or service from a division transferred to 
another division of the same firm or between firms 
with special relationships. Transfer pricing 
transactions can occur between divisions in one 
firm, between local firms, or between a local firm 
and a firm abroad (Yuniasih, Rasmini & 
Wirakusuma, 2012). Transfer pricing is also 
commonly defined as a value attached to the transfer 
of goods and services that occurs in a transaction 
between parties having special relationships. In 
business practices, transfer pricing is often carried 
out by multinational firms due to their large-scale 
transactions; therefore, it creates great opportunities 
for performing transfer pricing in business activities, 
e.g., selling, buying, or sharing the tangible or 
intangible resources with their affiliates (Conover & 
Nichols, 2000). 
 
The Effect of Firm Size on Transfer Pricing 
Aggressiveness 
Firm size is a scale used to classify firms into small 
or large firms according to various ways, e.g., the 
firm’s total assets, the market stock value, and the 
average level and the number of sales. Generally, 
firm size is classified into large firms, medium firms, 
and small firms. The greater total assets owned, the 
greater long-term prospects the firm has. In 
addition, it also reflects that the firm is more stable 
and more capable of generating profits than firms 
with relatively small total assets (Kurniasih & Sari, 
2013). 
Firms with large total assets show that they 
have reached the maturity stage where the cash flow 
is positive and is considered to have good prospects 
for a relatively long period of time (Waworuntu & 
Hadisaputra, 2016). Shackelford, Slemrod & Sallee 
(2011) also state that large firms have a greater 
opportunity to shift their income to minimize tax 
payments. This advantage significantly increases the 
incentives and reduces tax obligations by means of 
aggressively implementing tax avoidance practices 
through transfer pricing. Large firms are more 
aggressive in organizing tax planning strategies 
than small ones (Conover & Nichols, 2000). The 
greater opportunities and incentives, the more the 
bigger firms lead to transfer pricing aggressiveness 
(Waworuntu & Hadisaputra, 2016). 
 
H1:  Firm size has a positive effect on transfer 
pricing aggressiveness. 
 
The Effect of Profitability on Transfer Pricing 
Aggressiveness 
Firms with high profits are more likely to be 
involved in tax avoidance transactions or schemes 
(Rego, 2005). Profitability is the firm’s ability to earn 
profits in a certain period. Hermi (2004) explains that 
profit is earned from the difference between 
incoming assets (income and profits) and outgoing 
assets (expenses and losses). The firm’s profit can be 
retained (as retained profits) and divided (as 
dividends). Therefore, an increase in the firm’s net 
income will increase the return on investment in the 
form of the investors’ dividend income. Firms with 
high profits have an obligation to pay high taxes as 
well. In addition, profit is a measure of how much 
taxes a firm should pay. Firms experiencing a loss 
are not obliged to pay their taxes (Waworuntu & 
Hadisaputra, 2016). 
Probability is an indicator of managerial 
performance in managing the firm’s assets indicated 
by profits generated. Rego (2005) found that firms 
with high pre-tax profits tended to practice tax 
avoidance. They also tended to practice transfer 
pricing to reduce profits for tax avoidance. By 
practicing transfer pricing, firms can adjust prices 
for various transactions between divisions of firms 
that have special relationships (Richardson et al., 
2013). Transfer pricing has been to be the vehicle 
through which firms are shifting their income to 
low-tax jurisdictions and in some cases to no-tax 
regions (Barker et al., 2017). 
 
H2:  Profitability has a positive effect on transfer 
pricing aggressiveness. 
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The Effect of Leverage on Transfer Pricing 
Aggressiveness 
Leverage is the total amount outstanding (book 
value) of long-term debt divided by total assets. It is 
predicted to have a positive relationship with risk. It 
measures the proportion of how much debt funding 
sources finance the firm. Leverage shows how many 
debt funding sources the firm uses to finance the 
assets. Multinational firms generally finance their 
subsidiaries by means of debt and/or capital 
transfers to streamline tax burdens by engaging in 
transfer pricing practices (Richardson et al., 1998; 
Richardson et al., 2013). 
Firms with high leverage tend to take the 
opportunity to practice tax avoidance (Dyreng et al., 
2008). Waworuntu & Hadisaputra (2016) found that 
leverage had a positive effect on transfer pricing 
aggressiveness. Richardson et al., (2013) also found 
that the higher the leverage, the higher the 
opportunity for international firms to practice tax 
avoidance. Cahyadi & Noviari (2018) found that 
firms’ leverage was used to avoid taxes that should 
be paid to the state. Anh et al., (2018) found a 
positive relationship between leverage and transfer 
pricing aggressiveness. 
H3:  Leverage has a positive effect on transfer 
pricing aggressiveness. 
The Effect of Corporate Governance in Moderating 
the Relationship between Firm Size and Transfer 
Pricing Aggressiveness 
Corporate governance relates to the issue of 
accountability and responsibility, especially related 
to the implementation of guidelines and 
mechanisms for ensuring good behaviors and 
protecting stakeholders’ interests. Another major 
focus of corporate governance is economic efficiency 
which states that the corporate governance systems 
should aim at optimizing financial results, with a 
strong emphasis on the stakeholders’ welfare. In 
addition, the subject of corporate governance is in 
the stakeholders’ point of view, which demands 
more attention and accountabilities to parties other 
than stakeholders, e.g., employees or the 
environment (Rahman & Khatun, 2017). 
Large firms have a higher opportunity to 
exploit legal loopholes, especially in tax planning 
practices that aim at reducing tax payments at a 
lower average cost. Large firms tend to be more 
aggressive in organizing tax planning strategies 
than small ones (Conover & Nichols, 2000). The 
implementation of corporate governance can 
supervise and control the management; therefore, it 
does not violate rules and regulations and even 
prevents the firm from taking aggressive actions 
(Annisa & Kurniasih, 2012). Iqbal & Fachriyah (2007) 
found that corporate governance can be a useful tool 
to reduce earnings management practices. Noviari & 
Suaryana (2019) found that the better the 
implementation of corporate governance, the lower 
the tax avoidance. 
H4:  Corporate governance weakens the 
relationship between firm size and transfer 
pricing aggressiveness. 
 
The Effect of Corporate Governance in Moderating 
the Relationship between Profitability and 
Transfer Pricing Aggressiveness 
Corporate governance relates to the issue of 
accountability and responsibility, especially related 
to the implementation of guidelines and 
mechanisms for ensuring good behaviors and 
protecting stakeholders’ interests. Another major 
focus of corporate governance is economic efficiency 
which states that the corporate governance systems 
should aim at optimizing financial results, with a 
strong emphasis on the stakeholders’ welfare. In 
addition, the subject of corporate governance is in 
the stakeholders’ point of view, which demands 
more attention and accountabilities to parties other 
than stakeholders, e.g., employees or the 
environment (Rahman & Khatun, 2017). 
Rego (2005) found that firms with high pre-
tax profits tend to practice tax avoidance. They also 
tend to adjust prices through transfer pricing 
practices to reduce profits for the purpose of 
reducing tax avoidance. However, Annisa & 
Kurniasih (2012) found that firms implementing 
corporate governance could prevent and reduce 
aggressiveness. Even, it can reduce earnings 
management practice (Iqbal & Fachriyah, 2007). 
Christiana & Africano (2017) also found that 
corporate governance weakens the relationship 
between financial reporting aggressiveness and tax 
aggressiveness. The better the implementation of 
corporate governance, the lower the tax avoidance is 
(Noviari & Suaryana, 2019). Therefore, it has been 
proved that corporate governance can reduce or 
weaken tax aggressiveness.  
 
H5:  Corporate governance weakens the 
relationship between profitability and transfer 
pricing aggressiveness.  
 
The Effect of Corporate Governance in Moderating 
the Relationship between Leverage and Transfer 
Pricing Aggressiveness 
Corporate governance relates to the issue of 
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accountability and responsibility, especially related 
to the implementation of guidelines and 
mechanisms for ensuring good behaviors and 
protecting stakeholders’ interests. Another major 
focus of corporate governance is economic efficiency 
in which the corporate governance systems should 
aim at optimizing financial results, with a strong 
emphasis on the stakeholders’ welfare. In addition, 
the subject of corporate governance is in the 
stakeholders’ point of view, which demands more 
attention and accountabilities to parties other than 
stakeholders, e.g., employees or the environment 
(Rahman & Khatun, 2017). 
Firms with high leverage tend to take the 
opportunity to practice tax avoidance (Dyreng, 
Hanlon & Maydew, 2007). Research conducted by 
Bernard, Jensen & Schott (2006) pointed out that 
firms with higher leverage than equity are more 
aggressive in practicing tax avoidance. Good 
governance at the firm level can reduce tax 
avoidance practices. Sari et al., (2016) also found that 
good governance functioned as a control mechanism 
for managers’ opportunistic behaviors. Other 
researchers,  Christiana & Africano (2017)  also 
found that corporate governance weakens the 
relationship between financial reporting 
aggressiveness and tax aggressiveness. Further, 
Noviari & Suaryana (2019) found, the better the 
implementation of corporate governance, the lower 
the tax avoidance is. Thus, it can be argued that 
corporate governance can weaken the relationship 
between leverage and transfer pricing 
aggressiveness.   
 
H6:  Corporate governance weakens the 
relationship between leverage and transfer 
pricing aggressiveness.  
 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
This research is quantitative and it took the 
population of multinational firms listed in 
Indonesian and Malaysian Stock Exchanges from 
2018 to 2019. This period was selected due to the 
implementation of Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
(BEPS) issued by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). This 
research used purposive sampling to select 72 
multinational firms. 
The study used secondary data in the form of 
annual reports taken from the official website of 
firms listed in Indonesian and Malaysian Stock 
Exchanges, i.e., www.idx.co.id and 
www.bursamalaysia.com. The definitions and 
measurements of the research variables are 
described in Table 1. 
The data were analyzed using a Moderated 
Regression Analysis (MRA), which is a special 
application of multiple linear regression where the 
regression equation includes multiplication of two 
or more independent variables (Ghozali, 2018). The 
data analysis model used is as follows
 
TPA = α + β1.Size + β2.Profit + β3.Lev + e       (1) 
TPA = α + β1.Size + β2.Profit + β3.Lev + β4.CG + β5.Size*CG + β6.Profit*CG + β7.Lev*CG + e (2) 
Information: 
TPA : Transfer Pricing Aggressiveness 
Size : Firm size 
Profit : Profitability 
Lev : Leverage 
CG : Corporate Governance 
α : Constan 
β1... β7 : Coefficient 
e : Error 
Table 1. Variables and measurement 







Transfer pricing aggressiveness is measured by 
the ratio scale of 8 categories below: 
1. There are interest-free loans between 
related entities. 
2. There is a debt exemption of related 
entities. 
 
Richardson et al., 
(2013); 
Waworuntu & 
Hadisaputra (2016);  
Anh et al., (2018) 
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Variable Measurement Reference 
  
3. There are bad debts between related 
entities. 
4. There is a non-monetary provision 
between related parties. 
5. There is no formal documentation that 
shows the selection and application of the 
arm’s length principle. 
6. There is a transfer of capital assets to 
related parties without commercial 
justification. 
7. There is no justification for the arm’s 
length principle on transactions between 
related parties. 
8. There is a transfer of losses between 





Firm size is measured by the natural logarithm 
of total assets. Richardson et al., 
(2013); 
 Waworuntu & 
Hadisaputra (2016);  
Anh et al., (2018) 
Profit (X2) 
Profitability is measured by the natural 
logarithm of pre-tax profits. 
Leverage (X3) 
Leverage is measured by long-term debts 





Corporate governance is measured by the 
ASEAN CG Scorecard index below:  
1. Shareholder Rights  
2. Equitable Treatment of Shareholders 
3. Role of Stakeholders 
4. Disclosure and Transparency  




4. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Data Collection Results 
The population of this research consists of 95 Indo-
nesian and Malaysian multinational firms. There 
were five firms delisted during the research period 
and three firms presented loss statements and 15 
firms presented incomplete data. Therefore, there 
were 72 remaining firms used as research sample. 
The data were collected and presented as in Table 2.
 
Table 2. Sample selection 
Sample Number of Firms Percentage (%) 
Multinational firms listed in www.idx.co.id and 
www.bursamalaysia.com 
95 100% 
Delisted Indonesian and Malaysian multinational firms (5) 5.3% 
Indonesian and Malaysian multinational firms presenting 
loss statements 
(3) 3.2% 
Indonesian and Malaysian multinational firms presenting 
incomplete data 
(15) 15.8% 
Total samples 72 75.8% 
Descriptive Statistical Test Results 
This section elaborates the results of the descriptive 
statistical test on determinants of transfer pricing 
aggressiveness moderated by corporate governance 
in Indonesia and Malaysia. The average value of TPA 
was 0.5764 or five disclosure items, indicating that the 
level of transfer pricing practices in Indonesian and 
Malaysian multinational firms was relatively high, 
around 57.64% or above 50%. The standard deviation 
value of TPA was 0.19518 or 19.518% smaller than the 
average value. Therefore, it can be concluded that the 
TPA data were homogeneous. The minimum value of 
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TPA was 0.25 or two disclosure items indicating the 
firm had the lowest practice of transfer pricing 
aggressiveness. In comparison, the maximum was 
0.88 or 7 disclosure items indicating the firm had the 
highest practice.  
The average value of size was 29.9429 or an 
average asset value of IDR 39,214,667,813,035 
indicating that most Indonesian and Malaysian 
multinational firms were large firms due to their high 
asset values. The standard deviation value was 
2.0305, smaller than the average value. Hence, it can 
be concluded that the Size data were homogeneous. 
The minimum value of size was 25.18 or an asset 
value of IDR 86,464,032,000 indicating that the firm 
had the lowest asset value, while the maximum was 
33.49 or an asset value of IDR 351,958,000,000,000 
indicating that the firm had the highest asset value.  
The average value of profit was 26.9868 or an 
average pre-tax profit value of IDR 2,991,799,867,395. 
The standard deviation value was 2.2278, smaller 
than the average value. Therefore, it can be concluded 
that the profit data were homogeneous. The 
minimum value of profit was 22.33 or IDR 
5,005,150,944 indicating that the firm had the lowest 
pre-tax profit, while the maximum was 30.94 or IDR 
26,621,000,000,000 indicating that the firm had the 
highest pre-tax profit. 
The average value of leverage—when 
Indonesian and Malaysian multinational firms used 
long-term debt to finance their assets—was 19.5%. 
The standard deviation value was 17.8% below the 
average value. Therefore, it can be concluded that the 
leverage data were homogeneous. The minimum 
value of leverage was 0.00 or 0%, indicating that the 
firm had the lowest debt to assets ratio. It also means 
that the firm did not use long-term debt to finance its 
assets. On the other hand, the maximum value was 
0.66 or 66%, indicating that the firm had the highest 
debt to assets ratio. It also means that the firm used 
long-term debt to finance its assets by 66%. 
The average value of CG was 0.8167 or four 
disclosure items, indicating that Indonesia and 
Malaysia multinational firms had good corporate 
governance. The standard deviation value was 0.1979 
or 19.8% smaller than the average value. Hence, it can 
be concluded that the CG data were homogeneous. 
The minimum value of CG was 0.4 or two disclosure 
items indicating that the firms had the worst CG 
application. In comparison, the maximum was 1.00 or 
five disclosure items indicating that the firm had the 
highest CG application. The results of the descriptive 
statistical test are presented in Table 3.  
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
Information Minimum Maximum Average 
Standard 
Deviation 
TPA 0.25 0.88 0.5764 0.1952 
Size 25.18 33.49 29.9429 2.0305 
Profit 22.33 30.94 26.9868 2.2278 
Lev 0.00 0.66 0.1953 0.1777 
CG 0.40 1.00 0.8167 0.1979 
 
Classical Assumption Test Results 
The classical assumption test was used to examine the 
regression model in that the good regression model 
should not encounter any problems in the classical 
assumption test. It consists of normality test, autocor-
relation test, multicollinearity test, and Heteroscedas-
ticity test. The results of the classical assumption test 
are presented in Table 4. 
 










KS Test Runs Test Tolerance VIF Glejser Test 
Size 
0.200 0.812 
0.126 7.931 0.069 
Profit 0.174 5.732 0.079 
Lev 0.476 2.100 0.198 
The normality test used the Kolmogorov Smirnov 
test showing a significant value of 0.200, which was > 
0.05. It can be concluded that the normal assumption 
had been met; therefore, the regression model was 
suitable for use in the research. The runs test of the 
autocorrelation test showed a p-value of 0.812, which 
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was > 0.05. It can be concluded that there was no cor-
relation between disturbing errors during t and t-1 
periods; hence, the regression model was suitable for 
use in the research. The results of the multicollinearity 
test showed that the tolerance value was > 0.1 for firm 
size, profitability, and leverage variables. The VIF 
value was < 10 for firm size, profitability, and lever-
age variables. It can be concluded that there was no 
multicollinearity between independent variables. The 
heteroscedasticity test used the Glejser test showing 
that the significant value of the t-variable for firm size, 
profitability, and leverage was > 0.05. It can be 
concluded that the regression model passed the het-
eroscedasticity test. 
 
Hypothesis Test Results 
This research used multiple linear regression with 
moderated regression analysis (MRA) to prove the 
hypotheses. The confidence level used was 95%, 
which means that the tolerable error rate was 5%. If 
the significant value was < 0.05, it can be concluded 
that the independent variable had an effect on the de-
pendent variable. Based on the results of statistical 
tests, the following equation was obtained.  
 
Table 5. Hypothesis test results 
Variable 
Multiple Linear Regression Moderated Regression Analysis 
B t Sig. B t Sig. 
Constant 0.077 0.245 0.007 4.623 1.863 0.008 
Size 0.015 0.660 0.512 0.152 1.184 0.241 
Profit -0.002 -0.097 0.923 -0.009 -0.124 0.901 
Lev 0.276 2.146 0.036* 1.063 1.794 0.008** 
CG - - - 4.932 1.922 0.040* 
Size*CG - - - -0.140 -0.979 0.332 
Profit*CG - - - 0.014 0.143 0.886 
Lev*CG - - - -1.006 1.359 0.002** 
R Square 0.546 - - 0.523 - - 
Adj R Square 0.504 - - 0.494 - - 
F test 0.000** - - 0.000** - - 
* Significance at the 0.05 level     ** Significance at the 0.01 level 
 
The Lev variable had a coefficient (beta) value of 
0.276 with a significant value (p-value) less than 0.05 
(i.e., 0.036). The Lev.CG variable had a coefficient 
(beta) value of -1.006 with a significant value (p-value) 
less than 0.05 (i.e., 0.022). It can be stated that Size and 
Profit variables had no effect on transfer pricing 
aggressiveness. The significant value (p-value) of 
these variables was higher than 0.05. This was 
consistent with the Size.CG and Profit.CG variables 
that had a significant value (p-value) greater than 0.05. 
Therefore, it indicates that corporate governance did 
not affect the relationship between firm size and 
profitability and transfer pricing aggressiveness. 
 
Discussion 
Based on the results of the statistical test, H1, H2, H4, 
and H5 were rejected. It indicates that transfer pricing 
practices in Indonesia and Malaysia were not 
influenced by firm size and profitability. 
Unfortunately, corporate governance did not 
moderate the effect of firm size and profitability on 
transfer pricing aggressiveness.  
 
The Effect of Firm Size on Transfer Pricing 
Aggressiveness 
The results of the first hypothesis test showed 
that firm size did not affect transfer pricing 
aggressiveness. Firms, either with large or small 
assets, did not take advantage of the law’s loophole, 
especially in tax planning practices oriented towards 
minimizing the taxes that they should pay to the state. 
Firms, both large and small, were not aggressive in 
terms of transfer pricing practices.  
The average assets owned by Indonesian 
multinational firms in 2018 and 2019 were IDR 54 
trillion, while those of Malaysian were RM 5.8 billion 
(equivalent to IDR 20 trillion). Indonesian and 
Malaysian multinational firms are considered large 
ones. They do not practice tax avoidance through 
transfer pricing to protect their reputation as large 
multinational corporations. These results  are 
consistent with Rusydi's (2013) research stating that 
firm size does not affect aggressive tax avoidance. In 
other words, firm size is not a determinant factor for 
tax avoidance practices through transfer pricing. 
Wulandari & Maqsudi (2019) affirmed the results of 
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this research that firm size has no effect on tax 
avoidance. 
 
The Effect of Profitability on Transfer Pricing 
Aggressiveness 
The results of the second hypothesis test showed 
that profitability did not affect transfer pricing 
aggressiveness. Firms with high profits did not take 
advantage of pre-tax profits to avoid tax obligations 
by diverting profits to their subsidiaries. Firms, both 
with high and small profits, were not aggressive for 
practicing tax avoidance through transfer pricing 
practices. 
The average profitability generated by 
Indonesian multinational firms in 2018 and 2019 was 
IDR 4.6 trillion, while that of Malaysian was RM 248 
million (equivalent to IDR 871 billion). Indonesian 
and Malaysian multinational firms manage to 
generate a considerably large profit so that they do 
not need to practice tax avoidance through transfer 
pricing to boost their profit. These results are 
consistent with Waworuntu & Hadisaputra (2016); 
Anh et al., (2018); and Wulandari & Maqsudi (2019) 
who stated that profitability does not affect tax 
avoidance practices through transfer pricing. It 
indicates that transfer pricing practices in Indonesian 
and Malaysian multinational firms are not performed 
by diverting profits to their subsidiaries or related 
parties. 
 
The Effect of Leverage on Transfer Pricing 
Aggressiveness 
The results of the third hypothesis test showed 
that leverage had a positive effect on transfer pricing 
aggressiveness. Firms practiced tax avoidance 
through transfer pricing by transferring debts to their 
subsidiaries or related parties. Firms with high 
leverage were more aggressive in practicing tax 
avoidance through transfer pricing. In other words, 
Indonesian and Malaysian multinational firms that 
conduct opportunistic transactions more likely create 
a conflict of interest. Multinational firms finance their 
subsidiaries by means of debt and/or capital transfers 
to streamline tax burdens by engaging in transfer 
pricing practices (Richardson et al., 1998; Richardson 
et al., 2013). 
The leverage ratio owned by Indonesian 
multinational firms in 2018 and 2019 was 0.2, while 
that of Malaysian was 0.17. Indonesian multinational 
firms financed their assets through debt by 20% of the 
total assets owned, while Malaysian ones by 17% of 
the total assets owned. Leverage becomes the 
triggering factor for multinational firms to practice 
tax avoidance through transfer pricing. Both 
Indonesian and Malaysian multinational firms 
transfer interest on loans to related parties to 
minimize tax burdens that should be paid to the state. 
These results are consistent with Waworuntu & 
Hadisaputra (2016); Richardson et al., (2013); Cahyadi 
& Noviari (2018); and Anh et al., (2018) who stated 
that leverage affects transfer pricing aggressiveness. 
It indicates that Indonesian and Malaysian 
multinational firms practice transfer pricing by 
diverting debts to their subsidiaries or related parties. 
 
The Moderating Effect of Corporate Governance  
The results of the fourth hypothesis test showed 
that corporate governance did not moderate the 
relationship between firm size and transfer pricing 
aggressiveness. The result also showed that good 
governance simultaneously weakened tax avoidance 
practices through transfer pricing. Nevertheless, it 
partially demonstrated that firm size was not related 
to transfer pricing aggressiveness. Corporate 
governance neither strengthens nor weakens the 
relationship between firm size and transfer pricing 
aggressiveness.  
The results of the fifth hypothesis test showed 
that corporate governance did not moderate the 
relationship between profitability and transfer 
pricing aggressiveness. The results also showed that 
good governance simultaneously weakened tax 
avoidance practices through transfer pricing. 
Nevertheless, it partially demonstrated that 
profitability was not related to transfer pricing 
aggressiveness. Corporate governance neither 
strengthens nor weakens the relationship between 
profitability and transfer pricing aggressiveness.  
The results of the six hypothesis test showed that 
corporate governance weakened the effect of leverage 
on transfer pricing aggressiveness. Good governance 
at the firm level can reduce a firm’s tax avoidance 
practices. The results proved that diverting debts to 
subsidiaries or related parties in low-tax countries can 
be minimized if the firm implements good 
governance. These results are consistent with Sari et 
al., (2016), who stated that good governance functions 
as a control mechanism for managers’ opportunistic 
behaviors. It is also supported by Christiana & 
Africano (2017) who found that corporate governance 
weakens the relationship between financial reporting 
aggressiveness and tax aggressiveness. Other 
researchers who support this result are Noviari & 
Suaryana (2019) also found that the better the 
implementation of corporate governance, the lower 
the tax avoidance practices. 
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5. CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, 
SUGGESTION, AND LIMITATIONS 
This research concluded that leverage had an effect 
on transfer pricing aggressiveness. Firm size had no 
effect on transfer pricing aggressiveness. 
Profitability had no effect on transfer pricing 
aggressiveness. Yet, corporate governance weakens 
the relationship between leverage and transfer 
pricing aggressiveness. This research results provide 
empirical evidence about the determinants of tax 
avoidance practices through transfer pricing. 
 Good governance at the firm level can reduce 
also a firm’s tax avoidance practices. It proves that 
diverting debts to subsidiaries or related parties in 
low-tax countries can be minimized if the firm 
implements good governance. Therefore, this 
research also helps to increase economic growth and 
state budget (APBN). Furthermore, it also assists 
public policy makers, especially those in charge with 
the policies related to transactions with special 
relationship. 
This research has several limitations. Firstly, it 
merely used three independent variables as the 
determinants of transfer pricing aggressiveness, i.e., 
firm size, profitability, and leverage. This limitation 
can be complemented by other variables that are not 
considered in this research. Secondly, it merely 
covered two years of the financial reporting period, 
viz., 2018 and 2019. This limitation can be 
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